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RECENT DECISIONS
the political parties as organs of the state, or by the legislature itself
as in Nixon v. Herndon.10 Where a state attempts to do by indirec-
tion what it may not do directly, the validity of the act may be
questioned.11
R. L. L.
CONTRACTS-AGREEMENT TO COMMIT A TORT UNENFORCEABLE
-PUBLIC PoLICY.-Plaintiff contracted for passage on the Graf Zep-
pelin from Germany to New York. He knew that the exclusive news
rights of the flight had been acquired by a third party. As a condition
of being given passage he had agreed that he would give no interviews
and send no reports of said passage. Plaintiff thereafter contracted to
supply defendant with news through a pretense of answering mes-
sages from his friends. As a defense to this action defendant
set up the fact that the contract was made in violation of the terms
of the contract of passage. Held, the contract was in effect a con-
tract to commit a tort. The court will not aid one who has com-
mitted a tort to recover from another the price agreed to be paid
for his wrongful act. Reiner v. North Anterican Newspaper Alli-
ance, 259 N. Y. 250, 181 N. E. 561 (1932).
The law is ever anxious to safeguard and to protect the in-
terests of parties in existing contractual relations from intentional
and wrongful interference by strangers. An action will lie for
intentionally inducing a breach of contract without excuse or jus-
tification.1 Such conduct is considered a tort since it is a fraud
upon the parties and the public and is against public policy.2 The
contract for the exclusive news of the trip made between the owners
of the Graf Zeppelin and third parties was interfered with by the
contract between plaintiff and defendant. Such contract was in
effect a contract to commit a tort. The courts will not aid one who
has committed a tort to recover from another the price agreed to
be paid for the tortious act.3 The courts are called upon to make
a choice between two evils-either to enforce the contract in favor
of the tort feasor and allow him to recover for his unlawful act,
" Supra note 1.
'Supra note 6. See also Note (1930) 15 CORN. L. Q. 262; Note (1930)
- HARV. L. REv. 467; Note (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 423, for comments on Nixon
v. Condon as decided by the federal courts before reaching the Supreme Court.
'Lamb v. Cheney & Son, 227 N. Y. 418, 125 N. E. 817 (1920) ; Campbell
v. Gates, 236 N. Y. 457, 141 N. E. 914 (1923); Hornstein v. Podwitz, 254
N. Y. 443, 173 N. E. 674 (1930).
-Materne v. Horwitz, 101 N. Y. 469, 5 N. E. 331 (1886).
23 WmIusTo, CONTRACTs (1924) §1753.
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or to allow the defendant to receive the benefits of the contract
without compensating for them. It chooses the lesser evil and calls
the contract void. The defense is allowed not as a protection to
the defendant but as a disability to the plaintiff for his unconscion-
able conduct.4
H. B. S.
DEFAULT JUDGMENT-WHAT CONSTITUTES-APPEAL FROM.-
Judgment was recovered by plaintiff after an inquest at Trial Term,
before which proceeding defendant had asked for an adjournment
which was refused. After reversal by the Appellate Division of an
order granted in Special Term vacating the inquest and granting a
new trial, defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals. Held, no
appeal lies from a final judgment to review an intermediate order
refusing to vacate an inquest. Jensen v. Union Railway Company
of New York City, 260 N. Y. 1, 182 N. E. 226 (1932).
Judgment by default may be entered upon defendant's failure to
appear, after issue has been joined, when the case is called for trial.'
However, is it a judgment by default when defendant appears on the
day set for trial and requests an adjournment? The rule in New
York is fairly well settled that defendant is in default 2 and that his
remedy is to make a motion to vacate the judgment.3 However, if at
the time of trial, defendant has his request put on record, the judg-
ment is not by default.4 Though a mere technicality, the result is
far-reaching. The right of appeal is not inherent and did not exist at
common law, but it is purely a matter of statute.5 Accordingly, no
appeal will lie from a default judgment since the right is denied by
statute.6 If the defendant has his objection put on record, since the
'Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341, 343 (1775).
1 Pierce, etc. Mfg. Co. v. Kleinfeld, 53 Misc. 260, 103 N. Y. Supp. 86
(1907); Emmanuele v. Fruit Auction Co., 93 Misc. 493, 157 N. Y. Supp.
282 (1916).
'Silverman v. Mark, 148 N. Y. Supp. 259 (1914). See Flake v. Van
Wagenen, 54 N. Y. 25 (1873) for reasons denying appeal from default judg-
ment.
'White v. Sebring, 228 App. Div. 413, 240 N. Y. Supp. 477 (3rd Dept.
1930).
'Citizens' Trust Co. of Utica v. R. Prescott & Son, 221 App. Div. 426,
223 N. Y. Supp. 191 (4th Dept. 1927).
'Croveno v. Atlantic Ave. R. R. Co., 150 N. Y. 225, 228, 44 N. E. 968, 969
(1896).
" N. Y. C. P. A. §557, subd. 1: "A party aggrieved may appeal in a case
provided by law. He may not appeal from a judgment or order rendered or
made upon his default unless an appeal therefrom be expressly authorized by
law."
